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CHAPTER I

THE INITIAL SOVIET INTERVENTION: BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY

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NAPOLEON'S WORDS, 'Une armée dehors c'est l'État qui voyage', apply very well to the Russian armies which overran the countries of Eastern Europe as a result of the Second World War. If the Russian state had been a liberating democracy where power was in the hands of the people, the entry of the Red Army into the Eastern Europen countries would have inspired their populations to take their fate into their own hands, put an end to the military police dictatorships that terrorized them and establish the full sovereignty of the people. But the policy of the Russian occupation authorities was entirely different. For the first two or three years their primary objective was to preserve as strong an army and police force as possible under the control of the Communist Parties. With this task in mind the Communist leaders skilfully manipulated the pressure of the masses to introduce 'loyal' elements into the army and police and at the same time allied themselves with reactionary, even ex-fascist, heads of the old army and police. The second aim of the Kremlin was to call a halt to any action of the peoples which bore a really democratic and spontaneous character and which might therefore impede the Gleichshaltung of all public life. To achieve this, the same method was adopted of making alliances with the most right-wing, reactionary elements against the authentic Socialist Parties, Peasant Parties and, above all, against the peoples themselves.

A study of political life in the satellite states must begin with an analysis of this policy.

Pre-War Political Regime in Eastern Europe

Before the war, all the countries dealt with (except Czechoslovakia) had lived under a military dictatorship camouflaged

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642 661 728 by a parlimentary facade. Workers' parties, peasant parties and trade unions were all persecuted or forbidden, strikes were suppressed in blood, and brutal mass executions were not unknown. To give only one example, 20-30 thousand workers and peasants lost their lives after the overthrow of the Peasant Government of Alexander Stamboliisky in Bulgaria in 1923. The secret police of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could boast of rivalling the Gestapo in all the refinements of torture. The press was gagged. Parliamentary elections were a farce, as votes were bought, electors were terrorized, and voting was open, although the counting of the votes was secret. It was no accident that in only one out of the many national elections held in Rumania between the two world wars, did the government that was called upon by the king to arrange the elections fail to get the expected majority! The corruption and depravity of the public administration was immense. Symbolical of this corruption was King Carol's notorious mistress, Magda Lupescu, who appointed and dismissed Ministers and high officials, distributed government contracts, etc. National minorities in general, and the Jews in particular, suffered from official oppression and from 'spontaneous' outbursts of hooliganism organised by government agents. The alliance with Hitlerite Germany of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and many of the rulers of Yugoslavia seemed natural.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the collapse of the German military machine was greeted with joy by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who hoped to get rid of the previous shameful political and social order. The breakdown of the Gestapo unleashed a tremendous. independent upsurge of the people. The first task of the Russian occupation authorities was to grapple with this mass activity.

Bulgaria

669 642 728 In Sofia and other towns armed workers arrested fascists *en masse*, held mass demonstrations, set up elected people's tribunals, disarmed the police and established a workers' militia. Local committees took over the administration and the red flag was hoisted over all public buildings. The ferment was equally great in the Bulgarian army. Thus *The Economist* of October 7th, 1944, could write:

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'Reports on the Bulgarian forces of occupation in Western Thrace and Macedonia vividly recall the picture of the Russian army in 1917. Soldiers' councils have been set up, officers have been degraded, red flags hoisted, and normal saluting has been abolished.'

But the Russian and Bulgarian Communist leaders did not welcome the initiative of the masses. On the contrary, they did everything to stop 'anarchy' and restore 'order'. When Molotov met the Bulgarian armistice delegation, he made the following declaration: 'If certain Communists continue their present conduct, we will bring them to reason. Bulgaria will remain with her democractic Government and her present order . . . You must retain all valuable army officers from before the *coup d'etat*. You should reinstate in service all officers who have been dismissed for various reasons'. (*The New York Times*, January 16th, 1945). And earlier, on September 21st, 1944, *The New York Times* correspondent in Sofia reported that 'Communist leaders are doing everything they can to prevent extremists in the party from agitating for sovietization of the country'. Of the Red Army he said: 'On several occasions when local Communists in the provinces tried to displace city officials and take matters into their own hands they were ordered by the Russian military authorities to return the jobs to the old officials until orders were received from the Fatherland Front Government in Sofia'. The Fatherland Front government hastened to establish order.

As regards the restoration of 'order' in the Bulgarian Army, the same article in *The Economist* states: 'M. Velchev (Minister of War in the Fatherland Front Government—Y.G.) has issued a stern order to the troops to return immediately to normal discipline, to abolish Soldiers' Councils and to hoist no more red flags. Now Sofia reports that the Bulgarian army has been placed under the supreme command of Marshal Tolbukhin. Apparently, the Soviet commander has no patience with Balkan repetitions of 1917 . . . The Bulgarian Left seems to be ready to accept this policy, but it may be questioned whether it would have agreed to it so easily if its author had been Colonel Velchev and not Marshal Tolbukhin.'

In its programme, the Fatherland Front Government was careful to emphasize that it stood for the social *status quo* and

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for the maintenance of private property, Immediately after its establishment, the Communist leader, Anton Yugov, the Minister of the Interior, declared: 'This government, of which I am a member and on whose behalf I speak, categorically denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria. There is no truth in rumours that the government intends to nationalise any private enterprise in the country.' (*The New York Times*, 22nd September, 1944).

A few months later, at the national congress of the Fatherland Front in March, 1945, another Communist leader declared: 'We are building a democractic country based on private property and private initiative. Consequently the Government by its very nature is reformist.' He severely attacked those members of the Communist Party who opposed the Fatherland Front Government and wanted 'to establish a completely Communist government.' An article in the official paper of the Fatherland Front, *Otechestven Front* (9th March, 1945) described the programme of the Front in these words: 'It is the programme of the Bulgarian workers, peasants, craftsmen and women, honest, intellectual, patriotic individuals, industrialists, merchants and patriotic soldiers.' In a congress of the industrialists of Bulgaria on September 27th, 1945, a Communist Minister, Dobri Terpeshev, said on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council: 'Private initiative will not be handicapped but supported. The Communists intend to revive it because our economy needs your initiative . . . Let us all work without being led on by thought of gain alone.' A year later the Communist Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, declared: 'The immediate task is neither the realisation of Socialism nor the introduction of the Soviet system but the consolidation of a truly democratic and Parliamentarian system.'

From September, 1944, to October, 1946, the Fatherland Front Government was headed by General Kimon Georgiev who not only played a leading part in the military, semi-fascist *coup d'etat* of Tsankov in 1923, as a result of which tens of thousands of workers and peasants were massacred, but was also the author of the military coup of 1934 which led to the immediate dismissal of Parliament, the terrible persecution of Communists, Agrarians and others, and, for the first time in

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Bulgarian history, the dissolution of the trade unions and their illegalisation.* Georgiev's supporters wielded such power in the Fatherland Front Government that *The Observer* of 10th September, 1944, could remark: 'The composition of the Government suggests that the group that has now taken over in Sofia is the famous Military League which took power by a *coup d'etat* in 1934.' But *The Observer* did not mention one very important exception. The Minister of the Interior, who controls the police, was the Communist leader, Anton Yugov. The Communist leaders joined hands with the old Military League in order to keep 'order', the first victims of which were any workers who demanded an improvement in their condition, or—even worse—dared to press for immediate steps in the direction of socialism. Thus Constantine Poulos, writing from Sofia on June 2nd, 1945, said: 'Bulgarian Socialists (are) far to the left of the Communists . . . The Greek workers who demanded "bread and work" last fall are now dead, in jail or terrorized into silence. The Bulgarian workers who recently made similar demands were publicly denounced by the Communists as diversionists and enemies of the state; a handful of coal miners who struck for higher wages in March were castigated as "anarchists" and rushed off to jail by the Communist-controlled militia.' (*The Nation*, June 23rd, 1945).

In spite of these precautions, the transfer of Bulgaria from the German side to the Russian was not carried out as smoothly as the transfer of Finland, Rumania and Hungary, because Bulgaria does not belong geographically to the Russian sphere proper, but is on the border between the Russian and Anglo-American zones. Hence when the Germans retreated, many members of the ruling strata of Bulgaria hoped to switch over from the side of Germany, not to Russia, but to England and the United States. Russia therefore could not rely implicitly on the Bulgarian state machine, and between September, 1944, and March, 1945, a large-scale purge was carried out by

*This is what *Inprecor*, the official Comintern paper, wrote about the 1934 coup: 'A new military-fascist *coup d'etat* has been carried out in Bulgaria. In the night prior to May 19th the Muchanov-Gitchev government was overthrown and a military-fascist dictatorship established under the leadership of *Kimon Georgiev*, a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Reserve'. 'The leading elements in the present coup also played a leading role in the 1923 coup'. (*Inprecor*, 1st June, 1934). Now the official *Free Bulgaria* describes Georgiev's role in the 1934 coup in these words: 'In 1934 he took the post of Prime Minister and re-established diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.' (August 1st, 1949).

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661 the law courts. As a result, two thousand people were con-
728 demned to death and executed and another few thousands sentenced to very long terms of imprisonment.

That the Bulgarian people were successfully 'kept quiet' is illustrated by the fact that until April, 1948, the Communists did not find it necessary to hold even sham elections to local authorities; heads of villages and members of local councils were officially appointed by the Minister of the Interior!

Rumania

728 Rumania was the first of the Eastern European countries
642 reached by the Red Army, and Russia hastened to declare its intention of non-intervention in her internal regime. On April 2nd, 1944, Molotov declared: 'The Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania. It equally declares that the entry into Rumania of Soviet troops is solely the consequence of military necessities and of the continuation of resistance by the enemy forces.'

Russia's intention of keeping 'order' was reciprocated by the willingness of the Rumanian King and governing circles to collaborate with her. With scarcely a ripple Rumania changed her allegiance from Germany to Russia, the whole state apparatus—army, police and administration—going over to the Russian side when King Michael on 23rd August, 1944, arrested the Prime Minister, Marshal Ion Antonescu and appointed General Sănătescu in his place.

In March, 1945, after a number of changes in the Rumanian government, brought about by direct threats and pressure from the Russian army of occupation numbering a million men, Petru Groza became Premier, supported by Vice-Premier Gheorghe Tătărescu and four of his friends from the so-called 'Liberal Party', an equal number of Communists, and a number of individuals representing nobody.

728 Of Tătărescu, the Comintern paper, *Imprecor*, of December
642 8th, 1933, had said: 'In 1907 the Liberal Party, at that time led
661 by Sturdza, caused no less than 11,000 peasants to be murdered. The bloody suppression of the peasant insurrection in Tatar-Bunar was also the work of the Liberals, under the leadership of *Tătărescu*, who is now the Minister for Trade and

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Industry. The Liberal Party is also responsible for the volleys fired on the 13th of December against striking workers, as a result of which over 100 were killed. 728 661 642

'In December, 1927, it was the Liberal Party which organised the bloody anti-Jewish pogroms. Bands of students roamed through the streets beating up passers-by. The Minister of the Interior at the time was Duca, and the Secretary of State, Tătărescu. Under Liberal government corruption and jobbery reached their culminating point. The same Liberal Party exercised a brutal repressive terror against the revolutionary organisations; it suppressed all revolutionary newspapers and caused numerous workers to be murdered. Under Liberal government the class courts of the Rumanian bourgeoisie have sentenced many of the best leaders of the working class to long years of hard labour or to long terms of banishment in the salt mines.'

Tătărescu represented the extreme authoritarian wing of the Liberal Party and helped King Carol to establish his dictatorship. His foreign policy was oriented towards Hitler Germany. The British Communist weekly *World News and Views* of November 19th, 1938, described him thus: 'Tătărescu, the leader of the Right pro-Hitler wing of the National Liberal Party.' 728 642

Mihail Ralea, Minister of Culture in the March, 1945, Cabinet, was formerly a Minister under King Carol and an open admirer of the Hitler regime. Today he is Rumanian Ambassador to Washington. Father Burducea, the Minister of Cults in the March, 1945, Government, was one of the most notorious Iron Guardists (he had the decoration of the Buna Vestire, which was awarded to only thirty-two Guardists). Lotar Radaceanu, the Minister of Labour, was in Carol's totalitarian 'Renaissance Front.' One of the chiefs of the Propaganda Ministry, responsible for controlling the press, was Gheorghe Macovescu. Under Antonescu's fascist regime he held the same position, writing articles hailing the German-Rumanian alliance against Russia. Groza himself, the Premier since March, 1945, was before the war a very rich man, an owner of a big estate, factories and large hotels, and with big banking interests. He had been a Minister in two extremely right-wing governments under General Averescu (1920-1, 1926-7).

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642 471 Groza repeatedly stated that his government was against any socialisation and stood for the defence of private property. For instance, in an interview with the correspondent of *The New York Times* on 26th September, 1945, 'Premier Groza said his Government did not intend to apply either collectivization of land or nationalisation of banks or industries and that the mere question showed an ignorance of its program. Claiming to represent all social strata, he said, the program was to "concentrate all the forces of the nation for the reconstruction of the country and to consolidate a democratic regime" and "in the Government's program there is no nationalization of banks or industries and no collectivization of land"' (*The New York Times*, 30th September, 1945).

Radio Bucharest reported that in a description of his recent talks with Stalin, Premier Groza had said that it was Stalin who had advised him to 'keep the system of private enterprise and private property.'

Nearly three years after the advance of the Russian army into Rumania, Groza still openly opposed the nationalisation of any property belonging to either Rumanian or foreign capitalists, even though the nationalisation of foreign property is part of the program not only of socialists but even of many nationalist movements in countries in which a great deal of foreign capital is invested, such as Mexico, Argentine, India, etc. In a statement to the Bucharest paper *Timpul* he said: '. . . the Government and the Parliament will make every effort possible in order to realize a fruitful field of collaboration for foreign capital . . . (There will be—Y.G.) conditions intended to secure to this foreign capital a guarantee of investment and a just rentability.' (*International News*, Bucharest, 8th January, 1947).

642 661 Even capitalists who collaborated wholeheartedly with Germany were left untouched for more than three years, and the Communist Minister of Justice, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu went so far as to point out that Nazi collaborators were far more leniently dealt with in Rumania than, for instance, in France. *The New York Times* correspondent reported on 17th March, 1945: 'Industrialists, business men and bankers will escape punishment as war criminals, under a law being drawn up by Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, Minister of Justice, and Communist

4 [Premier of Rumania since March, 1945.--Analyst]

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member of the Government, it was learned today. Rumania could not afford to lose the services of merchants and industrialists, M. Pătrăscanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a more liberal policy toward this class than the French have.' What an outcry there would have been in the Communist press if a similar announcement had been made by a non-Communist Minister in the West!

Tătărescu did not hestitate to attack 'anarchists' (i.e., workers). In an interview with *The New York Times* correspondent in Bucharest on 21st October, 1945, he declared that a strenuous discipline must be introduced in industry and an end brought to the 'excesses' of the workers' committees.

It was hardly surprising that the capitalists faced the future with perhaps a little anxiety even if they were satisfied with the existing state of affairs. There was great optimism among businessmen, as the serious Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* pointed out (10th February, 1947) giving this illustration: 'As the Bucharest economic journal *Finantze si Industrie* reports, in the last year (1946—Y.G.) in Rumania there were established 355 new stock companies with a total capital of 20.3 milliard Lei.'

For years business continued to be good and speculation in the free market active, although the conditions of the working people were appalling and, after the drought of 1946-7, starvation stared them in the face. Some idea of the conditions of the people at this time can be got from '*A Survey of the Health of the People in Several European Countries affected by the War* published on November 19th, 1948, by *La Documentation Francaise* and consisting of reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross which describes the dreadful tragedy which overtook Rumania, the country most affected by the drought: 'It is difficult to convey the misery of the Rumanian population in 1947: famine prevailed in whole sections of the country, in some regions people were eating grass and the bark of trees and even clay. It is estimated that 6,000,000 persons were dependent on the government in 1947-48. Here are some of the consequences of the famine and misery which prevailed in this country: 1. The complete disappearance of little children in some districts . . . infant mortality actually reached a rate of 80% . . . 2. An increase of

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all kinds of diseases and a steep rise of the mortality rate; corpses were thrown into sewers adjacent to the houses. 3. Universal poverty conducive to the spread of venereal diseases . . . one out of twelve persons is syphilitic according to recent reports furnished by the Minister of Health . . .'

All this time the fortunes of the capitalists were not touched as they were working for reparations for Russia. They and the new state bureaucracy flourished, while the lion's share of the surplus value produced in Rumania was taken, of course, by the Kremlin.*

The bureaucratic and militarist character of the Rumanian state was not altered and many of the former officials remained in office. Of the legal system, Pătrășcanu could say: 'The procedures, methods, traditions and structure of Rumanian jurisprudence have remained unchanged since a Communist became Minister of Justice. No more than 20 new judges out of 2,000 have been appointed. About a quarter of the old staff have been purged or pensioned'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 12th December, 1945). This policy is symbolised by the fact that 'Just two weeks before the start of the trial of Iuliu Maniu . . . a discreet announcement was published in Bucharest newspapers recording the appointment of a new chief of the military tribunal of the second army corps district (the one to preside over Maniu's trial—Y.G.) . . . the wartime director general of all prisons and concentration camps in Rumania'. (*New York Herald Tribune*, 7th November, 1947).

The structure of the army remained hierarchical, with the complete subordination of the soldiers to their officers, and with no soldiers' committees. For three years even the composition of its personnel showed a marked continuity with the past. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolae Cambrea, commander of the Rumanian units fighting against Russia at Stalingrad, was promoted by the Groza government to the rank of General, and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff. Major Popescu-Argetoia, an active Fascist in the past, was put at the head of the secret police. General Vasiliu Rascanu, Chief of Military Police during the war against Russia, was appointed Minister of War. Another old general, Pretorian, was appointed Chief of Staff at the same time. General Lascar,

*See above pp.

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Brigadier-General on the anti-Soviet Front in 1941, who received the Knight Cross of the Iron Cross from Hitler, was, after joining the Communist Party, considered 'loyal' enough to be appointed Minister of War!

The enthusiasm of the Communist Party for 'law and order' is illustrated by their ardour for the monarchy. On November 3rd, 1946, Premier Groza declared: 'The King, the Church, the Army, the People and the Government are one'. A few days later, at a meeting of the Communist-controlled Front organisation, the National Democratic Bloc, Vice-Premier Tătărescu said: 'From Gheorghiu Dej (leader of the Communist Party—Y.G.) to myself we shall all fight together for the consolidation of the Monarchy, because we are convinced that the King is the strongest factor that rallies all Rumanians. We shall fight for the consolidation of the National Church and of private property, the source of all creative enterprise'. (*East Europe*, an informative London weekly, 13th November, 1946). On November 8th, King Michael's birthday, the Communist daily *Era Noua* said: 'The people of Rumania have faith in their King.' (*East Europe*, 20th November, 1946). In the election demonstrations of the National Democratic Bloc, a constantly repeated slogan was 'Trăiască Regele!'—'Long live the King!' On 17th November, 1946, at an army electoral meeting in Bucharest, Gheorghiu Dej concluded his speech appealing for a vote for the 'King's Government': 'Long live the King!' 'Long live his commanders and soldiers! Long live the Army which is his and the people's!' The monarchist enthusiasm of the Communist Party reached such heights that they attacked the Peasant Party leader, Maniu as . . . anti-monarchist. Thus *Era Noua* of December 3rd, 1946, referring to the withdrawal of Maniu and his followers from parliament, suggested that 'in fact, Maniu's unparliamentary attitude is only a guise for his anti-dynastic policy. Maniu has already tried his first obstructive move in King Michael's reign . . . Neither Ferdinand nor King Carol were exempt from Maniu's political tactics'! (*East Europe*, 18th December, 1946). To crown the hypocrisy of the leaders of the Communist Party, on November 8th, 1947, their paper, *Scanteia*, wrote: 'The people wish to His Majesty the King a long life, good health, and a reign rich in democratic achievements' (*The New York Times*, November 9th,

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642 1947). A few weeks later the Communist leaders compelled
662 Michael to abdicate (30th December).
665

Hungary

642 The policy of the Communist Party in Hungary in the first
728 stage of Russian intervention was similar to their policy in
471 Rumania and it is therefore unnecessary to describe it in detail.[1/1] The following quotation from the report of Nagy Imre, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party, to its congress in September, 1946, is typical of many declarations: 'While the war was still being fought, we have determined, and this is one of the basic principles, that in Hungary this is not the time for transition from capitalism to socialism, for struggle between the two social systems, but for uprooting the powerful remants of feudalism. It is not a question then of struggle between the two social systems but of the struggle between democracy and reaction within capitalism.'

The connection between this policy and Russia's interest in gaining control of the Hungarian economy (through mixed companies) and in extorting reparations from her, has already been described.[2/1] Here it is only necessary to repeat that for three years the Communist Party leaders continued to harp upon the same theme, that they were against abandoning the capitalist structure of the country.

1/1 [See category 116, pp. 136-141 -- Analyst]

2/1 [See category 116, pp. 60-62 -- Analyst]

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563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this communal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats, Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official. Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December, 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

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CHAPTER X

'PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES'— DICTATORSHIP OVER THE PEOPLE

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642 ALL THE COUNTRIES of 'People's Democracy' have very fine constitutions. Article 2, of the 'Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria' (approved by the Grand National Assembly on December 4th, 1947) states:

'In the People's Republic of Bulgaria all power emanates from the people and belongs to the people.

'This power is exercised through freely elected representative organs and through referenda.

'All representative organs of the State power are elected by the citizens, by a general, direct, and secret ballot.'

Article 88 states: 'The citizens of the People's Republic are guaranteed freedom of the press, of speech, of assembly, of meetings and demonstrations'. Articles similar to these two appear in all the constitutions of the 'People's Democracies.'*

How do these fine institutions work in practice? What is the actual interpretation of 'free elections' or 'freedom of the press, speech, of assembly, of meetings and demonstrations'?

'Free Elections'

666 Formally all the governments of Eastern Europe are responsible to parliaments, which are made up of representatives of the people democratically elected. In all elections the overwhelming majority of the electorate is stated to have voted and an overwhelming majority of the votes to have been given for the existing M.P's. In the Rumanian general elections of March 28th, 1948, 91 per cent of the electorate voted, of whom 90.8 per cent voted for the list of candidates supporting the present government. In the Czechoslovakian elections of May 30th, 1948, the corresponding figures were 90 per cent

*For a comparative analysis of the Constitutions of the 'People's Democracies' see Samuel L. Sharp, *New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere*, Washington, 1948, and A. Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe*, New York, 1949.

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'Freedom of Press, Speech, Assembly, Meetings and Demonstrations'

Like the provisions for 'free elections', these rights exist only 641
on paper. A comparison of the papers published in the different 'People's Democracies', the contents of the speeches made and so on, proves this. The extent to which the 'freedoms' exist is particularly obvious when there is any abrupt change of policy. For instance, up to the day on which Rajk was arrested, all the papers in Hungary competed in singing his praises, at meetings his name was mentioned side by side with Rákosi's and at demonstrations—the last, that of 1st May, 1949—his picture was very prominent and, according to the Hungarian press, the cheers he drew from the crowd were second only to Rákosi. When on 15th June, 1949, it was announced that Rajk had been arrested as a 'Titoist-fascist', all the press, without exception, attacked him in a most vicious manner. Within a week, the press was full of telegrams from meetings all over the country demanding 'punishment without mercy' for Rajk, and workers demanded 'A rope for traitors like Rajk', even before the date of his trial was announced. Not *one* of the thousands who had voted for him a month earlier when he headed the list of candidates in the Parliamentary elections made use of their 'freedom of the press and speech' (Article 55 of the Constitution) to propose to withhold judgment until the trial, far less to defend him. Furthermore, the people knew exactly what punishment would be meted out months before the trial. The rope was repeatedly demanded and he was indeed hanged. The mass meetings before Mindszenty's trial never demanded the death sentence but severe punishment; Mindszenty received a long prison sentence. Freedom of the press, speech, assembly, meetings and demonstrations amounts to the 'freedom' of the people to say exactly what the Government wants them to say.

To enhance 'freedom' of the press, the sale of books dating 642
from before the rule of the 'People's Democracies' is prohibited by Government decree. The Czechoslovak Government on January 10th, 1950, banned the sale of all books published in Czechoslovakia before May 5th, 1945, with the exception of certain specified text-books for schools and scientific journals, ordered all booksellers to clear their shelves of them within

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10 days, and required them to make a return of such books to the Minister of Education, and to keep them in a place 'inaccessible to the public'. Previously (November 22nd, 1949) all booksellers had had to make a list of all second-hand books in stock and not to sell them until they got permission from the Ministry of Information.

Even private correspondence is not immune from government interference. The Czechoslovak Government declared that from February 1st, 1950, anyone corresponding with persons abroad must deliver his letters personally to the post office, produce an identity card when handing it to the postal official and write his name and address on the envelope.

A very good description of 'freedom of demonstration' in Yugoslavia was given in the Royal Institute of International Affairs monthly journal *The World Today* (November, 1946). 'On the eve of the day fixed for the demonstration, instructions are given to the workers and civil servants, the trade unions, the ward committees, and the anti-Fascist organizations to get ready for action. They receive orders to report to fixed assembly points in the city at a stated time. Mimeographed lists of the slogans to be used are produced, and reliable persons appointed to direct the marching columns . . . The route and timing of the mass procession is carefully planned, and the school-children get busy painting the banners inscribed with the appropriate words, and decking the giant pictures of Stalin and Tito with flowers and wreaths of greenery'.

Democracy—The Only Way to Socialism

The leaders of the Communist Parties declare that the 'People's Democracies' are a stage on the path towards Socialism. To evaluate the correctness or otherwise of this assertion it is necessary to make clear the relation between the economic supremacy of the working class, its political rule and democracy.

In all previous history the class struggle has reached its climax in a fight for political power as the decisive weapon for the defence of the economic interests of the ruling class. This was the case in the bourgeois revolutions of the 16–18 centuries in Holland, England and France, and in the War of Independence in the United States. The bourgeoisie, which once

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175 took place, and in the generation before the First World
186 War a bitter struggle was waged against Magyar rule.
563 The exceptional character of Hungary's position was derived both from its traditions of provincial administrative autonomy, which can be traced to the thirteenth century, and from the fact that it had within its boundaries substantial Slavic and Rumanian minorities. Although the Hungarians, or Magyars, were less a minority than a member of the ruling group, they were by no means satisfied with the somewhat ambiguously defined rights of self-government granted when the Austrian Empire was created in 1804. The Hungarian nobility became an important force for reform within the empire and contributed many leaders to the liberal movement. Under the moderate guidance of Széchenyi important reforms were accomplished, but the more radical nationalist program of Kossuth was defeated in 1848-49 by the combined efforts of Austrian and Russian troops. Both the Magyar and the non-Magyar peoples were discriminated against in the period of Austrian centralism that followed, but with the military decline of Austria
• [64] the privileges of Hungary were reasserted. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, negotiated under the wise statesmanship of Déak, gave Hungary a constitutional position equal to that of Austria within the empire and a political influence that was frequently greater despite certain economic disabilities.

Although Croatia enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Hungary after 1868, having in fact occupied the position of a dependency of Hungary intermittently since the eleventh century, it still suffered many limitations. The experience of Napoleonic rule in 1809-13 and the growth of Gaj's nationalist movement under the name of Illyrianism brought Croatian national feeling to the point where it could no longer suffer with equanimity the cultural and political restrictions imposed by the Magyars. The neighboring

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were by far the most important; the increase of educational opportunities and general culture; and the development of the economy through agricultural improvement and the expansion of industry and trade.

Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to independent states with constitutions of strongly democratic tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe. The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made provision for parliamentary government based on wide suffrage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitutionalism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these countries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation before the First World War offers significant examples of governments being changed by orderly democratic procedures. Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and Italy in the period 1875-80.

Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional government than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most respects an independent state, but its social structure was more conservative and its desire for political democracy less evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

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non-Magyar minorities. Thus in a parliament that as late as 1910 represented scarcely more than one quarter of the adult male population, the Magyars who numbered just over one half the population, apart from Croatia, had 405 seats to 8 for the Slovak and Rumanian minorities. The Croatians were represented by 40 deputies when mutual Croatian-Hungarian affairs were under discussion. The Czechs and the Poles in the Austrian provinces developed an aristocratic form of local self-government in the latter half of the nineteenth century and contributed distinguished statesmen to the Austrian government, and at least the Czechs gained experience in the techniques and responsibilities of democracy in local government and in unofficial organizations. Similarly in the Polish-inhabited lands of the German and Russian empires, little opportunity was available for gaining experience in electoral and parliamentary procedures.

Educational opportunities in Eastern Europe were steadily improved in the century after 1815 despite frequently hostile government attitudes. The greatest progress in this field was made in the Czech-inhabited provinces of the Habsburg monarchy, where general compulsory education was introduced in 1869. In Hungary popular education was started somewhat later, and illiteracy among the Magyars declined rapidly. The schools, however, were used as a vehicle for the Magyarization of the non-Magyar minorities of Hungary and, as a consequence, the great majority of Slovak and Rumanian children were compelled to get their education in the Magyar language. In Hungary, discounting Croatia, there were four times as many Magyar-language schools as non-Magyar and five times as many Magyar schoolteachers. The Slovenes under Austrian rule and the autonomous Croatians fared a great deal better, while in independent Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, national school systems were developed insofar as meager resources permitted. The Poles fared differently in their three parts. In

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Much more was heard about Panslavism between 1848 and 1914, but during this period it was used primarily as a weapon of Russian expansionism. The Slavic movement evolved in Russia early in the century under the name of Slavophilism and, with the founding of a Slavic committee in Moscow in 1857, it entered a Panslav phase. In 1867 non-Russian Slavs were summoned to a congress in Moscow in connection with a Slav ethnographic exhibition, and at this meeting it was not difficult to discern the expansionist tendencies of Russian Panslavism. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1876-78, this movement developed into an outburst of emotional imperialism, and much was said of bringing all Slavs together under Russian rule. European power politics prevented an undue extension of Russian influence in 1878, but Panslavism came to serve Russian policy and was directed increasingly against the Habsburg empire. This trend was particularly evident at the third Panslav Congress held in Prague in 1908. Although the Russian constitutional reforms of 1905-06 made a favorable impression on non-Russian Slavs and brought about some real concessions to the Polish minority, Russian foreign policy never gave up the idea of pushing the Russian frontier to the West. Had the Tsarist regime survived the First World War it would certainly have demanded that large parts of Eastern Europe be annexed or brought into a satellite relationship, and a liberal Russian government might also have favored the Westward expansion of Russian influence.

The multinational empire of the Habsburgs offered the most challenging problem to the federalists, and the proposals for its constitutional reorganization were varied and ingenious, Of the many ideas arising out of the revolution of 1848, the most comprehensive was the constitution drafted by the freely elected Austrian assembly. After this assembly

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was transferred from revolutionary Vienna in October 1848, it met for four months in the Moravian town of Kremsier and drafted a federal constitution that had the twin virtues of coming from a free assembly and of granting equality to all national groups in the empire. Under this scheme thirty-nine nationally homogeneous districts (*Kreise*) were to be created within the existing crownlands of Austria. The lower chamber of a bicameral parliament was to be elected by universal male suffrage, thus guaranteeing to the different nationalities a voice in national affairs, and the individual districts were to have extensive rights or local self-government. The Kremsier assembly was dissolved before the draft constitution was formally adopted, but many students believe it plotted a course that might have saved the empire had the Germans become reconciled to the fact of their numerical minority.

Two decades of experimentation with various forms of centralism failed to strengthen the empire and, with the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 and the agreement between Hungary and Croatia in the following year, a new era of federalism was inaugurated. The balance established within the empire in 1867, though modified by concessions to the Poles and Czechs in Austria, favored the Magyars to a point that the Slav and Rumanian minorities could not tolerate permanently. In the face of Magyar resistance, constitutional amendment was not practicable before the defeat of the empire in 1918, but many proposals for reform were put forward. The Austrian Social Democrats, for instance, adopted a program in 1899 that called for creation within the empire of autonomous and nationally homogeneous territories with extensive rights of self-government. Nevertheless, their own party split into its several national components before 1914. Other proposals called for the division of the empire into as few as three and as

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642 563 many as fifteen federated states, and many hoped that reorganization along such lines would draw towards the empire the Slav and Rumanian peoples on its periphery and thus strengthen its international position. None of these proposals had a serious chance of success, however, and when the empire was finally defeated it disintegrated into its national units.

631 186 648 The independent states of Southeastern Europe faced problems that were different from those of the Habsburg lands, and their alliance and federation schemes were designed to meet the realities of power politics. Once the grandiose plans of the 1848er's had been forgotten, one of these being a proposal for a federation stretching from Poland to Serbia, new schemes were developed around the vigorous Serbian ruler Prince Michael Obrenović. Several agreements were concluded in the 1860's among the Serbian, Montenegrin, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Greek national leaders with the aid of Russian diplomacy, but these efforts were soon overshadowed by the Russian-Turkish conflict. In the long run, the territorial rivalries among the Balkan states proved to be the principal obstacle to their cooperation, and even the successful Balkan Alliance that defeated Turkey in 1912 disintegrated within a year into interallied war. What is significant is that the initiative throughout this period lay with the great powers, and the federation and alliance plans that got beyond the drafting stage were in general those backed by Russia or Austria-Hungary. The principal reality in international relations was the search for security on the part of these two powers that drove them to regard expansion into Southeastern Europe as a guarantee against political humiliation and military defeat. However, the balance was too close for either to succeed in this game, and it was left to a world conflict to clear the stage for a new order.

829 History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a "liberal" climate prevailed in Europe. At that time liberalism penetrated even into Tsarist Russia. The belief that Russia has an inherent tendency toward despotism and slavery leads one to forget that liberal ideas found excellent propagandists and defenders there; to mention but a few: Radishchev, Pestel, Herzen, Soloviev, Milyukov, Chernov, and the Decembrists. In the nineteenth century, liberal tendencies were growing in strength and influence in Eastern Europe and contributed considerably to the struggle for national liberation. The victory of the liberal Western democracies in 1918 led to the liberal democratization of almost all Eastern Europe.

III

668 The obstacles faced by liberalism in Eastern Europe in-
●642 cluded both the threat of Communist, and later of fascist and Nazi, interference and the efforts of domestic authoritarian groups that saw in dictatorship the answer to the problems of this region. In spite of these highly unfavorable circumstances, democratic liberalism maintained itself even when dictatorial governments were formed. A courageous opposition fought these regimes without fearing the persecution to which it was exposed. It is easy to prove that Pilsudski and, later, Beck in Poland, Horthy in Hungary, Carol in Rumania, Boris in Bulgaria, Alexander and Paul in Yugoslavia, and Dolfuss and Schuschnigg in Austria, were opposed by democratic forces stronger than, or at least as strong as, the forces which Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin were meeting in their respective countries. In Germany and Russia and, to a large extent, in Italy, the dictatorial regimes were totalitarian and therefore opposition was almost impossible. But the fact that in Eastern Europe only limited dictatorships were established shows that antiliberal, antidemocratic trends were hampered by the opposition of democratic forces. In

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this great struggle, many liberals, especially in Yugoslavia, 668
Rumania, and Austria, were lured into the services of dic- 642
tatorial regimes, and thus doomed themselves to failure.

It would be unjust to discount the actions of either Constantin Bratianu or Titulescu because of the opportunist Tatarescu who placed himself at the disposal of King Carol, or to forget the courageous Ion Duca who, for his uncompromising liberal principles, was assassinated in 1933 by the fascist terrorists of the Iron Guard. In Yugoslavia, there were a number of radicals and democrats enlisted in the service of the royal dictatorship. They thus distinctly deviated from the radical democratic tradition which, especially before the First World War, was represented by Nikola Pašić, famous for his revolutionary struggle against the dictatorial desires of the Obrenović rulers. Pašić was influenced not only by Western liberalism, in which the democratic Serbian King Peter I was educated, but by the revolutionism of the Russian Populists. The influence of the Russian revolutionaries was also strong in Bulgaria, especially in her agrarian movement. For some of those who associated with King Alexander's dictatorship, Foreign Minister Marinković for instance, there may have been extenuating circumstances, for those men were led by fear of the decomposition of Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, as in Rumania, some earnest liberals in Yugoslavia courageously opposed the royal dictatorship. Because of Stoyadinović, who put a shame on the liberal tradition of the Radical Party, one must not forget Aca Stanojević, a friend of Pašić, or Miša Trifunović who did not fear imprisonment and refused any collaboration with the dictatorship. In the opposition remained also Slobodan Jovanović, an influential professor of Belgrade University, who in the Second World War became the Premier of the Yugoslavian government in London. Against the royal dictatorship were also leaders of the Democratic Party: Ljuba

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668 Davidović and Božidar Vlajić among the Serbians, Večeslav
642 Vilder, a disciple of Masaryk, among the Croatians, and Milan Grol among the Slovenes. The famous Svetozar Pribičević distinguished himself for his courageous opposition to the Alexander dictatorship; he may be counted justly among the founders of Yugoslavia. He also was under Masaryk's influence, and it was through Masaryk's personal intervention with King Alexander that the interned Pribičević was allowed to go into exile. Pribičević gave an example to many others by repudiating his devotion to the Karadjordjević dynasty and becoming a radical republican. The royal dictatorship was opposed also by the Croatian Peasant Party, headed by Vladko Maček, and by the Serbian Agrarian Party, headed by Dragoljub Jovanović. The democratic opposition to the royal dictatorship has been cited in order to point out that when Titoist communism calls itself an "organic" result of the Yugoslav internal development, it does not make any allowance for the strong liberal tradition of Yugoslavia. In Hungary, C. Rassay was the most distinguished defender of liberalism.

The Bulgarian liberals played a prominent role in their country before the First World War but, in compromising with King Ferdinand, they were partly responsible for the unfortunate policies that led to the defeat of 1918. In the period between the two wars they were pushed into the background by nationalists and reactionaries such as Tsankov. Nevertheless, some Bulgarian liberals tried to preserve their own tradition. In 1924 Genadiev paid for his courageous devotion to liberal ideas with his life. Through the efforts of Malinov and Mušanov, the democratic regime was resumed at the beginning of the 'thirties, but the military *coup d'état* in 1934 installed a "progressive dictatorship." King Boris took advantage of this in order to establish his own dictatorship. The opposition of the liberals to this dictatorship was

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weak in comparison with that of the Agrarian Party which still followed Stambolisky's tradition.

The Agrarian and the Socialist parties and some Catholics, as well as the liberals, carried on the struggle against dictatorship in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary. They fought for real democracy in the sense of the best liberal tradition. In Austria the Social Democrats were the main force opposing clerical fascism. It is interesting that in Hungary the conservative aristocrats opposed fascist trends. Szálasi, who led the important Arrow-Cross movement, was the most conspicuous of these men. Count Bethlen and Count Teleki also opposed the Nazi pressure, and the latter's efforts were climaxed by his symbolic suicide in 1941.

The opposition to dictatorship and to fascism or Nazism was motivated differently in the individual Eastern European countries and was carried on by different political parties. Notwithstanding these differences, the original inspiration to opposition lay in two main ideas: a longing for freedom and a patriotic devotion to national independence. Pure democratic liberalism is the expression of these two ideas, both of which prove convincingly that the love of freedom was deeply rooted in these countries. Internal antiliberal forces alone would not have been able to crush democratic aspirations. Whenever the elections were more liberal than usual, for instance, in Rumania in 1928 or in Bulgaria in 1931, the democratic parties won. In Poland, Pilsudski's followers, who represented only a small minority of the nation, were well aware that the only means by which they could maintain their regime was political terror. In spite of the pressure of the reactionaries and the influence of fascists and Nazis, the remnants of liberalism in Hungary survived until nearly the end of the Second World War. In view of these facts, it is clear that the liberal democratic forces could have mastered internal difficulties successfully

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In the case of Eastern Europe, authoritarian forms of government were generally established as a result of a *coup d'état* carried out by groups already possessing power. In some cases, royal authority provided the basis for the seizure of power. Thus in the modified authoritarian regime set up in Hungary in 1920, Admiral Horthy served as regent on the vacant Habsburg throne, while in Yugoslavia and Rumania, royal authority was implemented by the existing bureaucracy and military establishment. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the *coups* of 1923 and 1934 were carried out by military and civilian leaders without royal authority and only in 1935 was King Boris able to gain control of the government. The regimes of Zogu in Albania and Pilsudski in Poland were likewise the result of civil-military collaboration, and the former did not proclaim himself king as Zog I until he had held power for three years.

Thus the *coups* in these nations were largely the actions of court camarilla or military cliques. They reflected relative inexperience with the techniques of parliamentary government and weak social structures. In part, they may also be attributed to the immense difficulties experienced by political leaders in their attempts to solve the complex domestic and international problems which existed in these states after the First World War. In any case, the resulting authoritarian regimes were essentially of the limited type; they did not, at least at the outset, approximate the totalitarian thoroughness of the succeeding dictatorships which came with the advance of fascist or Communist power.

In the expansion of totalitarian control, war and external aggrandizement have also played their parts; that is, whenever a dictatorial system managed to entrench itself in a major center of national power, it immediately sought to create an area of satellite states. Upon these the dictatorial system was imposed in order that they might be the more effectively controlled. Such was the history of Italian Fascist

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642 and German Nazi imperialism; such, also, is the story of Russian Communist totalitarianism. A whole ring of states in Europe and Asia have lost their independence and have been added to the totalitarian area because Soviet Russia and its instruments have so willed it, and because they have used force and sabotage to achieve it.

III

000 The immediate origins of contemporary dictatorships are thus clearly traditional. Like most tyrannies of the past, our twentieth-century tyrannies are the product of usurpation and conquest, of the *coup d'état*, and of military aggrandizement. But in reminding ourselves of this rather obvious fact, questions arise as to why the usurper and the tyrant have been so successful in our age and why free institutions have proven so vulnerable to their attack. That question can probably never be answered satisfactorily; nevertheless, it is possible to point to various unique circumstances and conditions which weakened or discredited free institutions or otherwise aided the would-be usurpers.

Of these the most obvious has been the fondness of this century for global war. In almost all belligerent countries, and especially in those that were defeated or unprepared to wage war, the economic and social disruption wrought by war produced social tensions and political extremism for which the normal integrative processes of free government often proved inadequate. War, moreover, eroded the integrity of the popular institutions of government. Constant emergencies, the need for decisive action at any cost, and the emphasis upon secrecy, caused men to discount the legislative and normal deliberative functions of such government if, indeed, it did not cause them to hold such functions in contempt; as a consequence, it was an easy step from

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000 might have been, aggravated the popular suspicion that democracy and representative institutions were inadequate to deal with the elementary problem of economic security, if, indeed, these institutions did not themselves bring on this problem.

The talking point most used by the Communist and other total dictatorships today is the wholly unjustified assertion that representative democracy cannot cope with the problem of guaranteeing elementary economic security, and that, if this problem is to be solved, mankind must suffer the harsh tyranny and arbitrary discretion of dictatorship. Until we succeed in extirpating from the minds of men the association of dictatorship and security, born largely of the depression and the aftermath of war and appealing especially to countries with little technological development, the future of representative institutions will be none too bright.

What has just been said does not apply directly to the earlier authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe since these, as already pointed out, came into being for the most part in the 1920's and hence antedated the depression. Nevertheless, this economic debacle aggravated the trend toward authoritarianism in these parts. In the cases of the second Bulgarian *coup d'état* in 1934 and King Carol's assumption of power in Rumania in 1938, economic influences can be discerned. The decline in trade and employment in the early '30's bore a distinct relationship to the weakening of the democratic regime in Bulgaria, and the incoming authoritarian regime adopted statist methods to meet these problems. Moreover, the depression weakened the resistance of the region as a whole to Nazi economic penetration, and the influence of the Western democracies declined as the world markets for the exports of Eastern Europe disappeared.

● 642 186 Another factor that paralyzed the democratic will and advanced the cause of reaction, especially in Eastern Europe,

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was the extreme nationalism that characterized many political and military leaders. In this region, diversion of state expenditures from armaments to social welfare and gestures of friendship to neighboring countries were regarded by many as a form of treason. The schools and the press preached incessantly that the vindication of a nation's territorial aspirations was a value of the highest order, and authoritarian leaders, acting in the name of such doctrines, generally met with little resistance. It was frequently only a small group of liberal-minded professional men, and in some cases the peasant parties, that placed a high value on social and economic improvement and resisted the authoritarian trend. Thus nationalism, which a century earlier had formed the vanguard of liberalism, now became its most treacherous enemy.

Any account of the vulnerability of free institutions must also comment on the peculiar and often fatal tolerance which democratic governments have exhibited during the past two or three decades towards those who have overtly threatened its existence. Those who governed free states hesitated to deny traditional rights to Communists, fascists, and others even though these groups clearly intended to use such rights to facilitate their own seizure of power. Many pages of recent history have chronicled this dismal story, especially those which tell of the success of German and Italian fascism and of Lenin's bid for power in Russia. Not until 1930 did the political leadership of the Weimar Republic muster the courage to ban street demonstrations, uniforms, vigilantism, and other abuses of the traditional rights of association and expression. By that time, however, Hitler had already sealed the fate of the Republic. He triumphed, even as Mussolini and Lenin had done before him, because the legal regime failed to deny him the opportunity of perverting the privileges of a free state. Among the narrower and more tangible causes of the great reaction, the paralysis

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665 actions a triple objective: to mislead the people, to prevent the postwar restoration of political parties by their original leaders and members or to break them up if they had been restored already, and to beguile foreign opinion into believing that multiparty systems still existed in the Eastern European countries.

The lack of popular support of the Communist parties is visible even today in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. For this reason, in the last elections in Poland and in Rumania in 1952, and in Hungary in 1953, the lists of candidates, made out completely by the Communists, were presented to the people under the disguise of a "National Front." The National Front is represented as a coalition of political parties, trade unions, youth organizations, scientific societies and so forth, and is highlighted by the names of "patriot-priests" and "progressive Catholics." The Communist press in Poland admits that the institution of the National Front was necessary in the elections of 1952 because in 60 per cent of the voting localities, especially in the villages, there were "white spots," that is, areas where there did not exist a single cell of the Communist Party.

665 In summary, it can be said that the Communist dictator-
177 ship was imposed upon the countries behind the Iron Cur-
642 tain under the name of People's Democracy through the following means: Moscow's strategic and political machinations during the war; the direct intervention of the Red Army and the NKVD in the internal affairs of these countries both at the end of and after the war; either the falsification of the will of these nations in the elections or the *coup d'état*, as in Hungary in 1947, and in Czechoslovakia in 1948.

665 An analysis of Communist strength clearly shows that the Communists could not have expected in a single case to assume power in a democratic and parliamentary manner. And, it must be added, the peoples of the Eastern Euro-

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665 tanism" of the West was introduced, and the Communists vigorously went about the destruction of the remaining private property, the collectivization of agriculture, and the transformation of the remaining independent cooperatives into a sector of the Communist state economy. It was therefore, in theory and practice a period of the establishment of socialist states, ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat and disguised by the name of People's Democracy. This period was marked by the accelerated tempo of the communization of all spheres of national life, by the integration of the economies of the People's Democracy into the Soviet economy, and by political and legislative preparations for the incorporation of these countries into the Soviet Union.

177 Analysis of the constitutions imposed upon the captive
•642 countries shows that the People's Democracies are dictatorships of the proletariat different in form but not in substance from the Soviet system. No matter when the constitutions of the People's Democracies were imposed or whether there were differences in their wording, the most important provisions are the same in each constitution. More light can be cast on these constitutions by the political circumstances in which they were imposed and by their preambles than by a dry analysis of their provisions.

[643] In Bulgaria in 1946 the Communists falsified the elections, and in 1947 they introduced in the Parliament the draft of a new constitution. According to this draft, the president was still to be the head of the state and not the Chairman of the Presidium of the Parliament as in Soviet Russia. On September 23, 1947, the leader of the opposition, Petkov, was hanged by the Communists, and on December 4, 1947, a revised constitution was imposed upon Bulgaria. This new constitution went further in its provisions than the constitutions imposed several years later in the other captive countries. The office of the president

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was abolished and the office of the President of the National Assembly was established. Article 1 does not speak of a "socialist state governed by the dictatorship of the proletariat" but neither does it mention "People's Democracy." It only proclaims that Bulgaria is a "People's Republic with a representative Government . . . where all power derives from the people and belongs to the people."

The Albanian Constitution of March 15, 1946, also proclaims that "Albania is a People's Republic in which all powers are derived from and belong to the people." It provides also that the "President of the Presidium of the People's Convention is the head of the State." The constitutions of both countries faithfully reflect the Soviet system and, in the event of the incorporation of these countries into the U.S.S.R., no significant constitutional changes would be necessary.

In Hungary on August 31, 1947, after the *coup d'état* of May 1947 against the government of Premier Nagy, new elections were held, and in August 1949 a new constitution was introduced. One section of the preamble to this constitution states the following:

> Our people under the leadership of the working class, steeled in the battles during the last decades, enriched by the experience of the revolution of 1919, and relying on the USSR laid the foundation of socialism and our country now is going forward by means of the people's democracy, toward socialism.

Hungary became a People's Republic (Article 1) and was proclaimed "a state of the workers and of the working peasantry" (Article 2). The constitution further stated that "The close union of the workers and working peasantry shall be accomplished in the Hungarian People's Republic under the leadership of the workers" (Article 3), and that "The working people shall gradually oust the capitalist elements and consistently build the socialist economic order" (Ar-

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642 177 ticle 4). The Presidium of the People's Republic with its President was established and the post of the President abolished.

In Czechoslovakia on May 9, 1948, following the *coup d'état* of February 1948, a new constitution was enacted. The preamble reads: "We, the Czechoslovakian People, declare that we are firmly resolved to build up our liberated State as a People's democracy which will ensure to us a [643] peaceful road to socialism." Article 1 states that "The Czechoslovakian State is a People's democratic Republic. The people are the sole source of all power in the State." According to this constitution, the President of the Republic remained the head of the state and Czechoslovakia still differs from the other captive countries in this respect.

In Yugoslavia, Tito introduced at the very beginning the most advanced form of a Soviet-style system; he recently reassumed the title of President of the Republic in place of the title of President of the National Assembly.

In Poland, after the falsification of the elections in 1947, a so-called Little Constitution, based on the Soviet system of councils, was introduced. It established a Council of State whose "chairman" was also the President of the Republic. On July 22, 1952, a new constitution was imposed upon Poland. The preamble to this constitution states:

> The Polish People's Republic is a republic of the working people. . . .
>
> As a result of the revolutionary struggles and changes, the power of the capitalists and landlords has been overthrown and the state of People's democracy has been established. The basis of the present people's power constitutes the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry. In this alliance the leading role belongs to the working class, the leading class of the society, basing itself on the revolutionary achievements of the Polish and international working movement, on the historical experiences of the victorious building of socialism in the USSR, the first state of workers and peasants. . . .

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The Polish People's Republic is a state of People's democracy. In the Polish People's Republic power belongs to the working people of town and country. (Article 1)

The office of the President of the Republic was abolished and the office of the Chairman of the Council of State became the highest post in the state. Poland is no longer the Republic of Poland. It is now called the Polish People's Republic.

In Rumania, the constitution of 1948 was replaced by a new constitution forced upon Rumania on July 18, 1952. The preamble to the new constitution declares that "The Rumanian People's Republic is a state of working people of town and countryside," and that "The present Constitution of the Rumanian People's Republic embodies the results so far obtained by the working people headed by the working class, in building a socialist society in our country." The highest organ of state power is the General National Assembly and its Presidium, while the highest executive and administrative organ of state power is the Council of Ministers. The organs of state power in regions, districts, towns, and rural localities are the people's councils of the working people of town and country.

The examples cited from the texts and preambles of the constitutions of the captive countries show clearly that, although the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union has achieved the first phase in the development of communism —"the socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat"—and is now on the way to the higher phase, the People's Democracies, according to communist theory, are still on the road to the first phase. This theoretical distinction made by the Communists has no great importance in practice particularly inasmuch as constitutional changes in all these People's Republics have made complete political and legal preparations for incorporation into the U.S.S.R.

As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, in the period of friendly

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642 Stalin-Tito relations her communist system was much fur-
177 ther advanced than that of any other Iron Curtain country, and since the break with Stalin only insignificant changes have been made in the structure of the highest organs of government. Tito still declares clearly and without any reservation that he intends to maintain the communist system in that country at any price.

IV

208 When communist propaganda speaks of the liberation of
661 the oppressed masses from the slavery of the privileged and the rich, it stresses the term, People's Democracy. But does this term really signify freedom? Does it respect human dignity? Does it recognize equality among the people? Does it abolish undue privileges and the exploitation of the working people? It does not. In practice, it does not even provide personal freedom or personal security.

697 The overcrowded prisons and the many thousands of peo-
661 ple in the forced labor camps bear witness to this. The Soviet Union and all the countries occupied by it are a large prison from which the majority of the people would escape if they only could. They would flee from the "Communist paradise" partly because of the difficult economic conditions, but mostly because of the unbearable atmosphere created by the insecurity and complete lack of freedom which are part of this system.

The majority of the people escaping today are average people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, small merchants, and others who have never belonged to any privileged or exploiting class. I have read a number of books on the living conditions in the Soviet forced labor camps; I have studied thousands of reports of Poles who have passed through Soviet camps and prisons; I have had hundreds of talks with the victims of the Soviet regime. And I have come

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cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws constantly increase the penalties for the plunder and destruction of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land, turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

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one's father, mother, brother, and sister in prisons and in forced labor camps, poisons the hearts of the young, and prepares them for participation in an imperialistic war against the interests of their own countries. 642

Moscow-controlled Communism also serves Soviet imperialism. It is the Soviets that occupied and imposed the Communist dictatorships upon the countries of Eastern Europe. If there had been no Soviet aggression or interference, not one of these countries would have a Communist dictatorship today. The basis for the exploitation of these countries and their systematic economic integration into the framework of the Soviet Union consists of secret trade agreements, so-called technical advisers, and economic plans for each country carefully adjusted to the plans for the Soviet economy. These Moscow-directed devices also determine the quantity of production and trade exchange in accordance with the political and economic objectives of the dictators in the Kremlin. In these countries Soviet generals and lower-ranking officers hold the posts of commanders, and prepare the younger generation for the betrayal of their own national interests and for service to their enemies. 648

For these reasons Communism, manifested as a dictatorship of the proletariat or as People's Democracy, constitutes, in theory and practice, a mortal danger to the existence of freedom, democracy, and peace in the world.

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participate in national elections and thus intensified the activities of the peasant political organizations. Only a decade earlier, because of the tax census system, none but a limited number of the peasants were entitled to vote, but in the national democratic states this right was granted to every male citizen over twenty-one years of age.

In Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, a considerable number of agrarian reforms were accomplished which distributed large surfaces of arable land to individual peasants. They thus became economically independent and from then on were valiant champions of the peasant program. No substantial land reform was carried out in Hungary until 1945.

Unfortunately, the initial success of the peasant parties was not given political effect everywhere and, where peasant regimes were established, they were not of long duration. The advances of the peasant parties were neutralized soon by the counter actions of totalitarian elements which were opposed to democratic principles in general, and to peasant political and social concepts in particular. The peasant parties, faithful to their programs, favored and supported genuinely democratic systems and cooperated with other democratic groups but, with the disappearance of the democratic order, their own position became precarious. It must be admitted that the complicated machinery of a democratic regime was unable to run smoothly at all times in the newly established national states, except in Czechoslovakia. However, this deficiency should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in democratic institutions nor as a disapproving attitude toward the principles of freedom which symbolize Western political thought. The democratic regimes came up against a complex of problems whose complete, satisfactory, and early settlement was somewhat unreasonably expected by the newly created national states. Profiting from these adverse and interrelated domestic conditions, the totalitarian elements found inter-

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vention possible. They usually claimed that this intervention was necessary "to save the country from the total chaos in which it was driven by the unsatisfactory operating of democratic institutions." What was even worse, new regimes were supported often by the Western democracies who used the unjustifiable excuse that "no other solutions were possible."

Despite the mistakes and failures of the democratic regimes, today even the most bitter opponents of peasantism must admit that the peasant parties, as political organizations, were stalwart champions of democratic government and did not, in general, support the established dictatorships or their undemocratic methods.

The greatest achievement of all the peasant groups was that of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. From its modest beginnings in 1896, the Union grew steadily. In the first postwar elections it received a strong relative majority in the National Assembly, and in the elections of April 1923, 212 deputies out of 245 were allotted to the Agrarian Union. At the relatively early date of October 1919, the first Bulgarian peasant government of Aleksander Stambolisky was formed. The most significant of its numerous political and economic achievements was the agrarian reform based on the principles that the land should be the property of those who till it and that every peasant is entitled to only as much land as he and his family are able to cultivate. In spite of the certain weaknesses and deficiencies of this peasant government which contributed to its downfall, its democratic basis cannot be denied. Its reforms converted Bulgaria into a country of small and medium peasant holdings which, despite the forcible overthrow of the peasant regime in June 1923, remained unchanged until the end of the Second World War.

In Czechoslovakia, the Republican Agrarian Party was the strongest party in the Parliament and the most important pillar of the Czechoslovakian democracy. After the political

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665 liberation of the Czechs and the Slovaks in 1918, the party's
642 main goal was to secure economic and social prosperity for the Czech and Slovak peasants, chiefly by promoting cooperative organizations and by defending the interests of the peasant populations. The party averaged forty-five deputies on all national elections and cooperated with other democratic parties in the governments of the Republic. The President of the Party, Antonin Švehla and his successor, Milan Hodža, were for many years Prime Ministers of the Czechoslovakian governments.

665 The Croatian Peasant Party, established in 1904 by the
185 brothers Ante and Stjepan Radić, reached its full political importance in the first postwar elections in Yugoslavia. This was in November 1920, and at that time the party became the undisputed choice of the Croatian people. In all free parliamentary elections since then, the Croatians, and especially the Croatian peasantry, have cast their votes in overwhelming majority for this political group. The principal aims of the party's program were Croatian national independence and social and economic justice. When the president of the party, Stjepan Radić, was assassinated in June 1928, Vladko Maček, who heads the party today, was elected president. In its political struggle, the party has opposed violently the Yugoslav centralism favored by the majority of Serbian political groups, and has been outlawed twice as "dangerous for the interests of the state." In August 1939, a compromise that opened the door for a just settlement of the Serbo-Croatian dispute was reached with the Regency of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and with certain of the Serbian political parties.

The beginnings of the Polish peasant movements date back to 1905, when the first Polish peasant associations were organized in Galicia under the leadership of Wincenty Witos. With this as an initiative, the Polish peasant party, *Piast*, was founded in Cracow in 1913. During the First World War,

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in the Russian part of Poland, another peasant party, *Liberation*, was born. Its leader was Stanislaw Thugutt. This party emphasized the solution of social and economic problems, demanding primarily an extensive land reform and distribution of the land to the peasants. In liberated and united Poland, these two peasant groups united in 1920 to become the strongest individual Polish political group, but later, in May 1923, one faction dissented. Witos was repeatedly elected Prime Minister and was holding this position in 1926 when the military *coup d'état*, executed by Pilsudski, put an end to democratic government in Poland. In 1928, during the dictatorship, all peasant political groups fused in a united peasant party under the leadership of Witos and Mikolajczyk, but, because of the undemocratic regime, this group was never permitted to take part in Poland's political life.

Although it may be argued that the embryonic stage of peasant organization in Serbia started in 1882 under the influence of the socialist ideas of Svetozar Marković, it is more correct to say that the first truly peasant movement in Serbia began in 1905 with the actions of Milislav Kurtović. In 1920, in the new state, Yugoslavia, the Agrarian Union of the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes was established, under the leadership of Joca Jovanović. The Union had little success among the Croatian and Slovenian peasantry, and was later known as the Serbian Agrarian Party. It recruited its followers mainly from the Serbian peasants in Serbia, Bosnia, and northern Dalmatia. The party was in the difficult position of being obliged to compete politically with two well-established Serbian parties, the Radicals and the Democrats. The provisions of the electoral law were unfavorable to the smaller political formations and, for this reason, the party was hindered from obtaining a proportional number of deputies in national elections. In June 1938, after the death of Joca Jovanović, Milan Gavrilović was elected the new president of the party.

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665 The initiative for a peasant organization in Rumania was
185 given in 1907, in Jassy, Bessarabia, by Constantine Stere,
642 who was influenced by Russian Populism. The Rumanian Peasant Party was formally founded in 1919, and Ion Mihalache was elected its President. In 1926, the Rumanian National Party from Transylvania, led by Iuliu Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom fused into one political group known as the Rumanian National Peasant Party, which became the strongest political organization of the country. In the elections of 1928, the overwhelming majority of votes were cast for this united peasant front, and a peasant government was formed with Maniu as Prime Minister. This party brought about some administrative, economic, and social reforms which aimed at the assurance of the progress of the Rumanian state. Unfortunately, the peasant rule was definitely handicapped by the international agrarian crisis which was at its peak during the period of the peasant government. The party's position was further aggravated by its continuous struggle with the liberals and by numerous intrigues of the Crown calculated to destroy the unity and vigor of the peasant group.

665 Because of specific conditions which existed in Hungary, the organization of the peasantry commenced relatively late. Sandor Czismadia made the first attempt to organize the landless peasants on the principles of agrarian socialism in 1896, but the genuine peasant movement was initiated by István Nagyatádi-Szabó in 1908. The movement grew in strength after the collapse of the first Communist regime of Béla Kun, but its original success and its hopes for the future were skilfully suppressed by the Hungarian ruling class. It was not until 1930 that Zoltan Tildy and Ferenc Nagy undertook the revival of a truly peasant political organization. As a consequence, the Hungarian Smallholders Party was founded. This party fought valiantly against all the odds of the authoritarian Hungarian regime, but was not able to at-

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visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe.

Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent their children to foreign universities, especially to France, Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East.

Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the instability of its political life. Governments changed constantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole-

somely large proportion of state funds was used for political competition. Taxes were high and the entire taxation system was geared to make the poor people pay for the political and economic program of the government or of the ruling classes. Planning was poor and administration far from efficient. Bohemia-Moravia had inherited from Austria a relatively competent administrative machinery, and Hungary's was organized along nineteenth-century lines. Administrative systems in former Russian and Turkish areas were a continuation of the previous imperial regimes, and were considered definitely the worst in Eastern Europe. Inefficiency and corruption mitigated somewhat the dictatorial character of these administrations. Bribery was customary and necessary on every level and affected the poor and the minorities. The problem of corruption was most serious in high official circles. Often the biggest fortunes were made in politics through embezzling discretionary funds that were left at the disposal of government members. Selling protective tariffs to industrialists in order to receive shares from foreign companies for concessions was a prevalent practice. Administrative officials were endowed with the nickname "bicyclists," which carried the implication that these officials trampled upon their subordinates and bowed before their bosses.

This attitude and the belief that the masses should support all projects of the ruling circles produced a harsh conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie, the mixed aristocratic and middle class, and the industrial workers and peasants. The fundamental conflict, however, was between the bureaucracy and the peasantry. The great differences in the cultural levels in many of the Eastern European countries made things worse. Different religious and ethnic groups and contrasting social standards contributed to regional hostilities and did nothing to facilitate the task of the administrators. The fault lay not alone with the rulers and administrators as is so often supposed by Western authors and statesmen. The people in

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Foreign Trade of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—1951 [4]

(IN PERCENTAGE OF TRADE WITH)

	USSR	*Other Communist Countries (including Eastern Germany and China)*	*Free World*
Poland	25	33	42
Czechoslovakia	28	32	40
Hungary	29	38	33
Rumania	51	28	21
Bulgaria	58	34	8
Albania	57	43	0

the economic system of the Soviet Union. The remaining four countries are less economically dependent on Russia. The place of Eastern Germany in interregional trade is very important. It is able to supply the rest of this area with much heavy and precision machinery, as well as potash and other fertilizers, in exchange for fuel, foodstuffs, and raw materials.

IV

185 The social policies of the satellite governments follow in
661 their general outlines those practiced by the Soviet Union
642 but may be described as somewhat more moderate, if only because the respect for human values has been more deeply ingrained in the westernized societies of Eastern Europe than they have in Russia.

The principle dominating these policies is that the Soviet-type revolution was made in the Eastern European countries in the interest of the people and that it continues to serve their interests. There is no speech made or publication issued be-

[4] P. Suslin, "The Consolidation of the Democratic World Market," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 5 (January 28, 1953), p. 10.

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hind the Iron Curtain that does not emphasize the eternal dedication of the People's Democracies to this fundamental concept. It is likely that some members in the lower echelons of the party are sincerely persuaded that this indeed is the case. Not so the ruthless social engineers among the top Communists. These experienced pupils of Moscow realize, of course, that in the Communist system there is a very definite hierarchy of goals, that first things have to come first, and that the expansion of industry comes before the welfare of the people. The two cannot be sought at the same time with the same intensity since the Communist state has not the means to proceed in both directions at once. There is reliable evidence that the four northern satellite governments opposed, insofar as they were able, the imposition on their countries of the immense goals and back-breaking burdens of industrial expansion. They regarded the enormously revised targets of 1950 and 1951 as burdens too heavy on their economies. Nevertheless, they had to yield to Moscow's pressure, which was probably connected with the outbreak of the Korean war. The relatively poor nations of Eastern Europe cannot afford both guns and butter. Since it had to be guns, butter has had to be delayed to a more or less distant future. If this is the case in the Soviet Union, it must be even more so in Eastern Europe. The result is a gradual, though uneven, lowering or at least stagnation of standards of living in Eastern Europe as compared to what they were during the first years after the recent war.

Such a generalization would, of course, be vehemently denied by the satellite governments. They publish statistical data to the effect that much new housing is being built, that more food is being produced and therefore consumed, and that the population is better clad with every passing year. A trained researcher will not accept these claims at their face value. The extremely generalized social statistics from this area are even less reliable than statistics on agricultural out-

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the ultimate responsibility for the collapse of Czechoslovakia must rest with the Western powers, yet it is conceivable that had the Eastern European states, above all Poland and Czechoslovakia, stood together, it might have been possible to stiffen the French spine at this fatal juncture. From Munich the road led to the crises of 1939, and eventually to the German-Soviet pact of August, which spelt the end of independent Eastern Europe.

Germany's economic penetration of Eastern Europe after 1933 was not a primary factor in the breakup of this region. While the reality of the penetration cannot be denied, for it meant much more than foisting aspirin and cameras on the Eastern European states, its importance may be questioned. This penetration did not really impair the political independence of these states until after the diplomatic situation had deteriorated greatly, and some of the German trade agreements which really bound the economies of the area were a result rather than a cause of the shift in the balance of power.

One may ask at this point about the influence of the domestic political and social problems of Eastern Europe on international relations. A good deal has been written about the failure of parliamentary and constitutional regimes in Eastern Europe, and their replacement by authoritarian regimes. Some have concluded from this that there was a tendency on the part of these regimes to gravitate toward Hitler and to refuse to have anything to do with the Soviet Union at a time when Litvinov was loudly calling, at the League and elsewhere, for collective security against aggression.

The relationship between foreign and domestic policy is always a complex and debatable one. In the case of Eastern Europe, however, one must steer a course between two inadequate interpretations of this relationship, which may be called the Popular Frontist and the Retrospective Vindica-

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tionist. The first, which is roughly the one described above, is not tenable. Documentary evidence which has appeared since the war makes it difficult to consider the Popular Front as anything but an instrument of Communist advance. It is quite evident that the Communists were not renouncing their ultimate aims either in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. It is also clear that the U.S.S.R. was not seriously prepared to stand up for the collective security it was calling for, although admittedly it was never required to do so. At the time of Munich, the Germans were not particularly anxious about the danger from the Soviet side. Moreover, it appears from the diplomatic memoirs of the Eastern European statesmen that they tended, as a group, to view the Soviet danger in the traditional terms of the "colossus of the East" as a perennial threat, whether or not it had a Communist regime. Thus their suspicions of the U.S.S.R. cannot be reduced to a reflection of the "class conflict."

Regarding the second interpretation, it should be recognized that there was a special antipathy to the U.S.S.R. on the part of the Eastern European countries, which led to certain misjudgments of the relative dangers existing in the 1930's. Pilsudski, for example, after ordering an intelligence survey of his two powerful neighbors in 1933-34, concluded that, while both were dangerous from the Polish point of view, in the short run the Soviet Union was more likely than Germany to follow an erratic and aggressive course. This proved to be a miscalculation. One nevertheless gains the impression that a similar mood was prevalent in the diplomatic circles of Eastern Europe. This served to reduce the area of maneuverability in the final crisis and did not afford any way out of the tragic impasse of 1939.

During the war years, Eastern Europe disappeared as a region of independent states. Germany and the Soviet Union divided most of the area into spheres of influence and, with the German attack on Russia in June 1941, the whole region

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main body of interallied agreements—particularly those of Moscow, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, along with the armistice agreements and the subsequent peace treaties—as their authority to impress the Soviet system of controls over the territories newly taken from the Germans.

By the end of 1945, the Soviet Union was in a position to control the political destinies of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria under the sanctions provided by the armistice terms. However, the process of coordination into the Soviet sphere was anything but smooth and gave little evidence of the much-vaunted Russian planning. Although Rumania was under the Russian thumb within twelve days after the signing of the Yalta agreement, that unhappy country remained a monarchy until December 1947. Czechoslovakia did not fall completely into the Soviet net until 1948, while Hungary fought a losing battle until 1947. Controlled elections elsewhere facilitated the extension of Communist power, so that between the period 1945 and the end of the year 1947 the process of political assimilation was completed. Local Communist parties were installed in all countries—save Yugoslavia where political control had been in the hands of the Communist Party since 1944—by the grace of the Soviet power. In this period the Soviet pattern of inculcating obedience through terror was rapidly imposed. 727 177 .64 642 S.U. 648

From the Soviet point of view this revolution was but an action on the part of sovereign states, rather than of satellite states as that term is used in the West. Not only were the states of Eastern Europe sovereign, according to Communist doctrine, but the Communist parties that controlled the political life of their respective countries held that their major function was to protect the national independence of their states against the imperialism of the West. This theory had expression in the basic document of the Communist Information Bureau—the resolution on world affairs which appeared on October 5, 1947.

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dialectic which would reflect the changes in his country's international position.

First, the policies of the Soviet Union and the ideas of Stalin himself were attacked as marked departures from the true path of Socialism. Second, in contradistinction to the policies of "bureaucratic state capitalism" evolved by the Kremlin and followed in slavish pattern by the satellites, Yugoslavia decentralized its machinery of economic planning, gave greater power to workers' councils, reorganized local government, and re-wrote the national constitution. An interesting feature of the recently amended constitution is the provision for a Council of Producers, as one of the two parliamentary bodies. In this council industrial workers are disproportionately represented by 135 deputies, while only 67 represent agriculture. Under this arrangement, the agricultural population has one representative for every 150,825 peasants, while the urban is represented by one deputy for every 30,239 workers.

In its organization, the Council of Producers is strikingly similar to another proposal advanced by another state that adopted the philosophy of integral nationalism, Mussolini's Corporative Italy. According to the latter, the corporations were instruments responsible for "the regulation of the productive forces, with a view to the development of the wealth, the political power and the well-being of the Italian people." This statement of purpose does not differ greatly from the ideology advanced by Kardelj on behalf of the new constitution.

In any event, the character of the power structure—that is, the structure of social power focused on the state—has not changed. Decentralized though the power may be, the Communist party still controls the councils where important decisions are made. Effective opposition to the regime is still unknown. Democrats who have opposed Tito and his policies still remain imprisoned and, while important concessions

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642 have been made to the peasants, state cooperatives are still maintained in the heavy grain producing areas by forces other than the peasants' love of the soil and its products.

If the Yugoslav government will learn the meaning of Lord Acton's axiom on the nature of power, and if the West pursues an intelligent, long-range foreign policy supporting Yugoslavia against Soviet aggression, it may be possible to revive in Yugoslavia and hence in the Balkans as a whole the elements of an independent political life.

V

000 The months following the death of Premier Stalin in March 1953, saw a number of internal changes in the various people's democracies. The principal means of coercion and political control nevertheless remained unchanged: the army and the police forces. These were still bound tightly to Russian controls.

177, 70 701 625 The total number of men in the satellite armies available for service with the Soviet army has been estimated at a million and one-half. Since they are not only trained under Soviet commanders, but operate under the Soviet military code, it is possible to state that the Sovietization of the satellite armies has been completed. Together with the armies, the satellite police form the backbone of the Soviet instruments of coercion. Estimated at a total of 700,000 men, police units organized in military formations range in function from the well-known secret police to People's Militia, Frontier Guards, and Railway Guards. Like the satellite armies, the satellite police are governed by Soviet regulations. Together they enforce a system of order which has been designed to conform with the Soviet model.

241 656 In common with Yugoslavia, certain states in the orbit are strengthening the weakest sector of the economy: agriculture. It is not certain that the Yugoslav experience compelled the

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177 .64 642 631 By 1949, Soviet-style dictatorships had been established in seven of these thirteen sovereign states. In these "Iron Curtain" states, dictatorship was and is exercised through a native minority who could not have won power without the support of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armies, and who—with the conspicuous exception of Yugoslavia—could not retain this power if Soviet support were withdrawn. The indirect rule thus exercised by the Soviet dictatorship, with the help of native personnel, over six of the Eastern European states —Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—might remind the observer at first glance of the indirect rule exercised in past centuries by the empires of Turkey and Russia over some of the principalities then existing in the region. Upon this superficial view, it might seem that despite all the violent changes in political sovereignty and national allegiance during the last one hundred years, the fundamental dependence of the peoples of this region upon foreign powers had remained essentially unchanged.

175 This impression would be quite deceptive. In 1853, the government of Eastern Europe by only six powers had endured for more than two hundred years, with Sweden and Poland rather than Greece and Montenegro playing the roles of the fifth and sixth power at the side of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Turkey. With the single exception of Poland, which by the end of the eighteenth century had become the victim of her neighbors, the administrative services of these powers were generally based upon foreign personnel drawn from peoples outside the region. Austria and Prussia depended upon the military and administrative services of Germans, Russia upon those of Great Russians, and Turkey in the last analysis had to rely upon the support of the Ottoman Turks. Natives of the different regions supplemented the personnel of these administrative services but did not dominate it. The rule of these foreign or semiforeign empires over the peoples of Eastern Europe was based upon this region's

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been.

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it.

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property

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642 423 563 rights of the Polish minority in Germany. It was designed to prevent them from acquiring what was considered German land and to deprive them of such German land as they had managed to acquire in the past. In addition to driving the Poles from German soil, this policy was also designed to eliminate Polish minorities in Eastern Germany by assimilation or expulsion, and the German word *ausrotten*—or exterminate—leaves little doubt as to the ruthlessness of the determination behind this policy. After the First World War, when certain parts of Silesia were incorporated in Poland, former German properties in industrial corporations and other valuables had a way of coming into Polish hands. When from 1939 to 1944 German armies in turn occupied a large part, and later all, of Poland, large amounts of Polish property were again transferred to Germans.

425 563 In one shape or another, with or without benefit of legal form, this game of transferring property from the temporarily weaker to the temporarily stronger nationalities was played in large areas of Eastern Europe. When in the course of the First World War the Austro-Hungarian government collected large amounts of taxes and additional amounts of ostensibly voluntary war loans for the war efforts of Germany and Austria from the unwilling Czech, Slovakian, and Polish populations, the Austrian empire was in effect transferring important parts of the national wealth of these regions into German hands to be spent for German political and military purposes.[2] After the First World War, formerly Austrian or German mines, banks, and industrial enterprises in Czechoslovakia had a way of becoming Czechoslovakian. After 1939, when the Nazis occupied this country, Czecho-

[2] Cf. G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-188; Wilhelm Winkler, *Die Einkommensverschiebungen in Osterreich während des Weltkrieges*, (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 74-78, 219-2^1; Alois Rasin, *Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First Year of Its History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 7-25.